LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES  18 NOV 2014 ,1—18                       

In China, ‘the centre decides and the local pays’ means the central government decides on policies but requires its local subordinates to provide the financial resources. The politics of this practice implies that local government has to take different strategies to cope with the unfunded mandates with various consequences. As an empirical study framed by Niskanen’s rational choice theory and Dunleavy’s ‘bureau-shaping’ model, this paper examines how the unfunded mandates impact local government behaviour. Its main focus is the question of how the local officials respond, the extent to which they comply or resist and the techniques they use to adapt to these mandates. This paper finds when deciding how to pay the bill for the centre, local officials have to take a number of principles into consideration. They need to stick to the people-orientated principle and to finance money for salaries and operation to the extent that they can; they also have to see if the mandates are strictly implemented or popular among local people.（SSCI)

中央决策，地方埋单：中国地方政府财政管理的政治逻辑

在中国的政府间财政关系中存在着中央政府决策，地方政府埋单的现象。这种现象的政治性在于地方政府不得不采取不同的应对策略并会带来不同的结果。作为一项经验研究，本文在尼斯凯南的理性选择和敦立威的官僚形成模型的框架下检验了这种特殊的政府间关系在中国是如何影响地方政府的行为。论文聚焦于地方官员如何应对上级的政策，多大程度上他们服从或拒绝，他们又有哪些应对技术等研究问题。论文发现地方政府在做决策时实际上要考虑多种元素。他们要坚持以人为本的原则，但有时中央政府政策的刚性程度或者其在地方受欢迎的程度也是重要的决策变量。