2020-04-30
英文标题：State Fiscal Constraints and LocalResponses: Evidence from the Property Tax Limit Overrides in Massachusetts
作者：魏文池（中国人民大学公共管理学院讲师）；J.S. Butler（美国肯塔基大学教授）
魏文池|中国人民大学公共管理学院讲师
研究问题
本文以美国马萨诸塞州 (Massachusetts) 地方政府为研究样本。州政府对地方政府施加房地产税征收限制 (property tax limit) ，同时允许地方政府以全民公投的形式推翻 (override) 州政府的房地产税限制。本文的主要研究问题为，在这种关于地方政府房地产税征收限制的制度性背景下，什么因素会影响地方政府官员提出公投推翻的动议？什么因素会影响地方选民赞成或反对推翻州政府的房地产税征收限制？
文章介绍
马萨诸塞州对其351个城市 (municipality) 地方政府每年征收房地产税的额度和增长率有明确限制。相对于上一年度的房地产税征收额度，本年度的房地产税征收额增长率不得超过2.5%；在任何情况下，地方政府每年征收的房地产税不得超过当年本地可征税的房地产的价值的2.5%。同时，马萨诸塞州允许地方政府推翻州政府的房地产税征收限制，前提是顺利通过两个必要的流程。第一，地方政府官员达成一致意见决定提出推翻房地产税征收限制的公投动议；第二，地方选民投票，若过半数，则成功推翻州政府的房地产税征收限制。本文应用经典的政治经济学理论，如中位选民理论 (median voter theory)、议程设置理论 (agenda-setting theory) 等进行理论分析，并提出可验证的假设。在此基础上收集数据并进行量化分析以验证假设。
研究方法
Two-stage Heckman selection model；first-differencing model等。
研究发现
Results show that a higher property tax rate reduces the likelihood of government officials’ override attempts, but previous override experiences have a positive influence. Voters bearing a higher property tax rate are less likely to approve the override, but override experiences in the previous year and the “menu” approach increase the likelihood of approval. Relatively more evidence supports the Leviathan government and agenda-setting theories in explaining overrides of Massachusetts’s property tax limit.
论文摘要
Abstract: This research examines the determinants of the likelihood of property tax limit override attempts and successes in the context of Massachusetts’s Proposition 2½. The authors apply the “Leviathan” government theory, median voter theory, and agenda-setting theory to develop theoretical expectations and use data from Massachusetts municipalities for 1991-2013 as a sample for empirical tests. Override attempts are not randomly proposed; therefore, the two-stage Heckman selection model is used to address selection bias in the investigation of the likelihood of override successes. Results show that a higher property tax rate reduces the likelihood of government officials’ override attempts, but previous override experiences have a positive influence. Voters bearing a higher property tax rate are less likely to approve the override, but override experiences in the previous year and the “menu” approach increase the likelihood of approval. Relatively more evidence supports the Leviathan government and agenda-setting theories in explaining overrides of Massachusetts’s property tax limit.
